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ENTERTAINMENT LAW – THE SPECTER OF
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS AND
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
JACK P. SAHL *
I. INTRODUCTION
There is significant risk today that lawyers will become the target of a
disciplinary or legal malpractice action, especially given the complexity of the
law and advances in technology that reduce the amount of time that lawyers
have to reflect about client matters. 1 This risk is heightened by the increased
competition in the bar to deliver legal services in a cost-effective manner, the
sophistication of clients who expect competent, efficient and reasonably priced
services, and the litigious nature of consumers. 2 The risk is further
*

Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Miller-Becker Center for Professional
Responsibility at the University of Akron School of Law. I would like to thank my research
assistants, Tracy Signet and Shane McCammon, who assisted me in researching and writing this
article, and Danielle Moskos, Brenna Fasko, William Shelly, Mike Rasor, and Stephanie Haight who
helped with annual revisions. This article is a revised version of an earlier work that was originally
published by the Practising Law Institute in March of 2010, and has since been edited by the
Marquette Sports Law Review editorial staff.
1. Kenneth J. Abdo & Jack P. Sahl, Entertainment Law Ethics: Part 1, 22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 2
(2004). See generally Ameet Sachdev, Total Attorneys: Chicago-Based Firm Under Fire, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 13, 2009, at Business Section, 1 (reporting that Connecticut is investigating, for possible
violation of its advertising rules, a legal information website, TotalBankruptcy.com, that provides
certain lawyers the exclusive rights to contact consumers generated by the site in return for lawyers
paying sixty-five dollars per contact).
2. Sachdev, supra note 1. Consumers may be more litigious concerning certain types of legal or
business services. See Stewards of James Brown Estate Sue Morgan Stanley, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2008, at C3 (discussing a dispute over the estate of the legendary soul singer, James Brown, and
stating “it is not atypical for estate lawyers or court-appointed trustees to sue former business
managers, [although] it is unusual for them to sue the banks that managed the accounts overseen by
the former business managers . . . .”). See also Washington v. Escobar, No. 103027/09, 2009 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 2596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (concerning, in part, a common dispute in the entertainment
industry where talent refused to pay for the services of a personal manager claiming that he acted as
an employment agency in violation of the state’s “theatrical employment agency” statute) [hereinafter
Escobar). The statute involved in Escobar, N.Y. Gen. Bus Law Section 171 section (8), was held to
apply to a booking agent who secured lectures and other engagements for a prominent theatrical and
motion picture industry personality. See generally Friedkin v. Harry Walker, Inc., 395 N.Y.S.2d 611
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977) cf. Park v. Deftones, 84 Cal Rptr.2d 616 (1999) (voiding a contact under the
California Labor Code between a band and a personal manager because he secured performance
engagements without being licensed as a talent agency); Stan Soocher, ‘Unlicensed Agent’ Won’t
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exacerbated by the ever-changing methods and rules for electronic
communication and the storage of information. 3 The magnitude of the risk is
underscored by the prediction that law school graduates will be the subject of
three or more claims of legal malpractice before finishing a career. 4
This article examines some good practice standards that minimize the risk
that a lawyer will become the target of a legal malpractice or disciplinary
action. These standards should also reduce the risk of a lawyer becoming the
object of a disqualification or Rule 11 motion. 5 This article discusses these
Stop Suit by Manager, 25 ENT. L. & FIN. 5 (2009) (discussing Escobar, No. 103027/09, 2009 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 2596).
3. Experts have noted the new landscape concerning electronic communication and the storage of
information. See generally George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal
System Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2007). For example,
There has been a civilization-wide morph, or pulse, or one might say that information has
evolved. But quite recently there has been an evolutionary burst in writing technology–a
jagged punctuation on a 50 century-long sine wave. A quick succession of advances
clustered or synced together, to emerge into a radically new and more powerful writing
technology. These include digitization; real time computing; the microprocessor; the
personal computer; e-mail; local and wide-area networks leading to the Internet; the
evolution of software, which has “locked in” seamless editing as an almost universal
function; the World Wide Web; and of course people and their technique. These
constituents have swirled into an information complex, now known as the “Information
Ecosystem.”

Id. at 1, 5-7. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), which is
generally considered the first definitive case dealing with the wide range of electronic discovery
issues in litigation. In this case, the court held that a plaintiff was entitled to discover all relevant
emails which had been deleted and were now only on back up disks on the defendant’s computers.
See also, Jack P. Sahl, The New Era—Qua Vadis 43 AKRON L. REV. 1, (2010) (discussing the
Miller-Becker Institute for Professional Responsibility Inaugural Symposium, “Lawyers Beyond
Borders” and “Practicing Law in the Electronic Age”).
4. Ronald, E. Mallen, Legal Malpractice: A Look at the Trends, TRIAL, Jul. 1, 1997, available at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Legal+malpractice:+a+look+at+the+trends.-a019634474. See
generally JEFFREY M. SMITH & RONALD E. MALLEN, PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 2 § 1.1
(2nd ed.1996) [hereinafter SMITH & MALLEN].
5. Haraguchi v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 590, 591 (2006) (providing an example of a
successful disqualification motion in an entertainment related case, albeit in an unusual setting
involving a prosecutor and her office). In Haraguchi, the court upheld the disqualification of a Santa
Barbara County district attorney from working on a rape by intoxication case because of her
entertainment activities. The district attorney had self-published a novel, “Intoxicating Agent,” that
concerned rape by intoxication which she was promoting while prosecuting an identical charge
against the petitioner-defendant. The court found “sufficient factual similarities between the novel
and the petitioner-defendant’s case to suggest that the district attorney [relied] on petitioner’s case for
plot lines.” Id. at 596. The court noted that “[n]o current public employee should be permitted to
exploit his or her official position as a lever to earn extra private income where such will inure to the
detriment of the employer.” Id. The court found a disabling conflict of interest in Haraguchi
because, in part, there is a “reasonable possibility that the [district attorney] may not exercise her
discretionary functions in an evenhanded manner.” Id. at 597. The district attorney’s interest in
seeing “her book succeed will trump her duty as a prosecutor to see that justice is done and to accord
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standards in the entertainment law context but they also apply to a variety of
practice areas, for example, sports law. 6
II. SCREENING THE CASE AND CLIENT
One of the most important and difficult decisions an entertainment lawyer
makes is the decision to represent a particular client. 7 Client representation
may subject the lawyer to a variety of risks, for example, third-party lawsuits
for tortious interference with contract, 8 tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage, 9 defamation, 10 and Rule 11 sanctions. 11 Lawyers
to defendants their constitutional rights.” Id.
6. Many courts have held that attorney-agents are bound by their state’s lawyer ethical rules when
representing athletes. See generally Melissa Neiman, Fair Game: Ethical Considerations in
Negotiation by Sports Agents, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 129 (2007) (discussing conflicts of
interest and reasonableness of fees as they apply to sports attorneys and agents); see also Gary P.
Konn, Sports Agents Representing Professional Athletes: Being Certified Means Never Having to Say
You’re Qualified, 6 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 1, 7, 15 (1988) (suggesting, in part, ways to avoid
incompetency in the area of sports representation). See generally In re Dwight, 573 P.2d. 481, 484
(Az. 1977) (holding in a non-sports context that an attorney who is engaged in the practice of law
“may not defend his actions by contending that he was engaged in some other kind of professional
activity”).
7. See David A. Hyman, Professional Responsibility, Legal Malpractice and the Eternal
Triangle: Will Lawyers or Insurers Call the Shots?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 353, 373 n.89 (1997/1998)
(quoting Robert E. O’Malley, Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Law Firms, 20 U. TOL. L. REV.
325, 361 (1989) (proposing that “[s]ome of the worst claims in the history of the legal profession are
directly attributable to the bad judgment of an individual partner in accepting a new client”)).
8. Source Entm’t. Group, LLC v. Baldonado & Assocs, P.C., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39209
(D.N.J. 2007). Source Entertainment, a management and entertainment company, signed a
management agreement with a minor, Tiffany Evans. Id. at *1. The management agreement was
subsequently approved by a New Jersey Superior Court. Source obtained a record deal with Sony
Music, agency representation with William Morris, and a steady stream of acting jobs and singing
performances. Id. at *2. Evans allegedly became unhappy with Source and contracted with
Baldonado & Associates (Baldonado), the defendant law firm, to represent Evans in all aspects of her
entertainment career. Id. Baldonado sent a letter to Source purportedly terminating its management
contract with Evans. Id. The district court dismissed Baldonado’s motion for a judgment on the
pleadings and ruled that at this stage Source had stated a valid claim for tortious interference of
existing contractual relations, tortious interference with existing and prospective economic advantage,
and defamation. Id. at *8. In New Jersey, a tortious interference with contract claim requires the
plaintiff to show “(1) it was a party to an existing contractual relationship; (2) the defendant
intentionally interfered with that contractual relationship; (3) the interference was undertaken with
malice; and (4) plaintiff suffered damages resulting from the interference.” Id. at 4. See TortiousInterference Claims, 5 ENT. L. & FIN. 7 (Aug. 2007) (explaining briefly the holding in Source Entm’t
Group, LLC).
9. See generally Source Entm’t Group, LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39209 (D.N.J. 2007). For a
“tortious interference with existing and prospective economic advantage” claim, the plaintiff must
prove “(1) it had a continuing or prospective economic relationship or reasonable expectation of
economic advantage; (2) the defendant knew of the contract or relationship of expectance; (3) the
interference was done intentionally or without justification or excuse; (4) it is reasonably probable
that the plaintiff’s loss was a result of defendant’s interference and (5) damages resulted from the
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nevertheless often expose themselves to the risks associated with client
representation by accepting employment based on inadequate information
about the client and his or her effect on the firm’s practice. 12
interference.” Id. at 6.
10. Id. In Source Entertainment Group, LLC, the defendant law firm sent a letter purportedly
terminating Source’s management contract with the artist, Tiffany Evans, to third parties, such as
Sony Records and the William Morris Agency. The district court permitted the plaintiff to proceed
with its defamation claim and noted that defendant’s letter stated that Source “continually mistreated
Tiffany.” Id. at *7. The district court also rejected the defendants’ arguments that they were immune
from liability under the so-called “litigation privilege” because they were attempting to protect
Tiffany’s right to disaffirm the management contract. Id. “Under the litigation privilege, an attorney
is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matters concerning another so long as the
communication was “‘(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other
participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) have some
connection or logical relation to the action.’” Id. (citing Hawkins v. Harris, 141 N.J. 207, 216 (1995)
(quoting Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J. Super. 446, 460 (Law Div. 1977)). The district court held that
the defendants’ defamatory statements were not made in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding.
Although New Jersey law does not limit the litigation privilege to courtroom statements, none of the
other contexts in which the litigation privilege attaches, such as statements made during settlement
negotiations and private conferences with an attorney regarding litigation, were applicable. Id. at 7.
11. See generally Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Heslep, 2007 WL 1435395 (N.D. Tex. 2007). The
plaintiffs, recording companies that owned or controlled copyrighted sound recordings, sued Diane
Heslep for copyright infringement by peer-to-peer file sharing. Id. at *3. Heslep argued that the
plaintiffs’ attorneys should be sanctioned under Rule 11 because Heslep “established that she was at
work at the exact date [January 6, 2005] and time the amended complaint alleges she was online
infringing on Plaintiffs’ copyrights, that AOL has confirmed that she was not herself online at the
specific date and time in question, and that AOL could not identify the specific computer in use at the
date and time in question.” Id. at *5. The district court found evidence that suggested that Heslep’s
assertions were disingenuous, and it noted that Heslep did not deny infringing on the plaintiffs’
copyrights “‘on other occasions on or before January 6, 2005.’” Id. at **4, 6. The court ruled that the
plaintiffs’ attorneys acted reasonably in attempting to resolve the dispute with Heslep and that their
conduct did not merit sanctioning. Id. at 6. However, the court sanctioned Heslep’s lawyer under
Rule 11 because she filed a frivolous Rule 11 motion against the plaintiffs’ lawyers for the purpose of
harassment. The frivolous motion also unnecessarily increased litigation costs. Id. at *8. See also
Downloading Suits/Rule 11 Sanctions, 23 ENT. L. & FIN. 7 (2007) (briefly discussing the holding in
Atlantic Recording Corp.).
12. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 83. “A significant cause of claims against
attorneys is the acceptance of new matters, whether from new, current or former clients, without
sufficient analysis of the clients and the transactions.” Id. One of the risks confronting lawyers is that
they may be criticized because of the type of clients they represent or their clients’ conduct. For
example, the music industry in piracy cases was portrayed in the media as the “heavy” for prosecuting
teenage offenders. See Samantha Chang, Legal Matters: Piracy Showdown Likely in High Court,
BILLBOARD, Oct. 12, 2003 (quoting entertainment lawyer and associate professor Stan Soocher). The
entertainment lawyers who represented the music industry risked being viewed in a similar light.
Another significant risk is that the client will not pay the lawyer’s fee. See e.g., Musburger v. Meier,
914 N.E.2d 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). In Musburger, the lawyer represented a radio personality who
agreed to pay attorney fees, expenses, and five percent of the gross amount of the contracts that he
negotiated for Meier. Id. at 1201-02. In affirming a jury award of $68,750, the court held that an
attorney who is representing a client on a contingent fee basis is entitled to quantum meruit recovery
when discharged. Id. at 1209; Stan Soocher, Radio Personality Must Pay for Lawyer’s Services, ENT.
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There are several considerations and steps at the intake stage of the
lawyer-client relationship that can provide lawyers with more information
about the risks associated with accepting specific employment. 13 This
information and an understanding of the profession’s ethics rules will help
lawyers avoid becoming the target of a malpractice or disciplinary action. 14
The first step for minimizing the likelihood of a malpractice or
disciplinary action is for the lawyer to conduct the initial client interview in a
manner that elicits a good understanding of the client’s concerns and
objectives. 15 As the professional, the lawyer bears significant responsibility
for effectively communicating with the client given the lawyer’s training,
knowledge, and authority to act on behalf of the client. The balance of power
in the initial lawyer-client interview is often skewed heavily in favor of the
lawyer, so it is incumbent upon him or her to be sensitive, resourceful, and
professional during the interview to gain not only important information but
also the client’s confidence. The lawyer’s use of non-leading and open-ended
questions and the encouragement of client narratives about his or her situation
are often effective approaches for promoting full disclosure and
understanding. 16 The lawyer’s use of leading questions and follow-up
comments should help the lawyer shape the direction of the interview and
facilitate greater disclosure. 17
LAW & FIN. 1, 3 (2009).
13. See SMITH & MALLEN supra note 4, § 2.7, at 87-88.
14. This article primarily cites provisions of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the
“Model Rules”) adopted in 1983 by the ABA House of Delegates [hereinafter MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT]. The Model Rules have been amended over the years and were substantially
modified in August 2001, and February and August 2002 “as a result of changes proposed by the
ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, popularly called ‘Ethics,
2000.’” See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, 2008 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
1 (2008). Some version of the Model Rules is followed by almost every state, although some states
have retained concepts found in the predecessor code, the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
(the “Code”) adopted in 1969 [hereinafter MODEL CODE PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY]. See MORGAN &
ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 12-13 (2006).
15. It is important that the lawyer attempt to avoid interruptions during the interview,
demonstrate an interest in the client’s story, and where appropriate, express support for the client’s
predicament. This should build trust and rapport with the client. During the interview, the lawyer
should also note important facts or questions in writing and apprise the client that subsequent
communications or interviews may be necessary before undertaking representation. See NOELLE C.
NELSON, CONNECTING WITH YOUR CLIENT xi (1996) (discussing communication techniques at the
initial interview stage and emphasizing that “[t]he key to delivering legal services in a way that
ensures client cooperation and satisfaction is communication”).
16. Id. at 32-33 (recommending “[o]pen-ended questions [that] allow clients to talk about their
problems or concerns from their point of view”).
17. Id. at 35 (reporting that once the lawyer has established a rapport with the client “by asking
open-ended questions and appreciating the answers,” the lawyer should “move on to narrowly
focused questions to get the specific answers you need”).
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Determining the client’s objectives is particularly important for the
entertainment lawyer who also may be working as an agent or manager while
practicing law. 18 For example, an artist may want a lawyer to provide legal
representation on a contingent fee basis while also managing the artist’s
personal affairs. 19 Because the roles of a manager and a lawyer can differ, the
lawyer should ascertain the precise nature and scope of services the client
wishes the lawyer to perform to preclude any confusion. 20
Second, the lawyer should ascertain the client’s reasons for seeking the
lawyer’s services. 21 The client’s reasons may range from reports about the
firm’s strong reputation for good work to its reasonable fee structure and
policy regarding the advancement of litigation-related expenses. 22 Educating
the client about the firm’s policies is especially critical at the intake stage
because it diminishes the likelihood that the client may feel deceived or
betrayed about the basis for employment. The lawyer should correct any
misconceptions about the firm—for example, that a particular lawyer will staff
the case or that the firm’s relationship with another party, such as a film or
record company, will produce success.
Lawyers also should consider the intake stage a valuable opportunity to
assess the effectiveness of their marketing efforts. For example, a client may
inform the lawyer that the firm’s advertising prompted the client’s visit. If the

18. See Kenneth J. Abdo & Jack P. Sahl, Entertainment Law Ethics Part 2: Agents, Managers
and Lawyers, 22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 2, 4 (2005); Kenneth J. Abdo, Shopping Record Deals for
Lawyers: A&R Approach and Ethics Issues, 23 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 4-5 (2005). This is also an
important consideration for attorneys working in the sports law field. See Neiman, supra note 6, at
125 (reporting that more than fifty percent of all agents for professional athletes are lawyers).
19. Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18. The fiduciary duty of non-lawyer managers may be more
circumscribed than that of lawyer-managers who understand contractual terms. See generally Reznor
v. J. Artist Mgmt., 365 F. Supp. 2d 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing Nine Inch Nails lead singer
Trent Reznor’s motion for summary judgment). In the motion, Reznor claimed that his manager had
breached his fiduciary duty, but the court held that that a jury could find that, because his manager
was not a lawyer, “he did not understand” the terms now at issue and he thus “fulfilled whatever duty
he owed Reznor by disclosing all the material terms and facts of which he was aware.” Id. at 575.
See also Recent Cases, 27 ENT. L. RPTR. 7 (2005) (reporting that the court also dismissed Reznor’s
claim that the management contract was unconscionable).
20. See Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18, at 3 (explaining that managers negotiate contracts, provide
business assistance, and often “nurture the artist’s career,” while lawyers shop talent and creative
material, provide financial advice, and protect the client’s interests under the governance of
applicable ethical guidelines). See generally Day v. Rosenthal, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985), superseded by statute on other grounds, CA. CODE ANN. §340.6, as recognized in Laird v.
Blacker, 279 Cal. Rptr. 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (deciding one of the more egregious cases involving
a lawyer who performed multiple roles, including serving as the business manager and financial
advisor, for a client—in this case, the actress, Doris Day).
21. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 87.
22. Id.
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lawyer learns that the client was referred to the firm, the firm should thank the
referring party. 23
Third, effective client screening at the intake stage involves some
assessment of the client’s character traits. 24 Lawyers may not want to
represent difficult clients. Difficult clients may be those who: (1) unduly
criticize lawyers and the legal system; (2) insist on ethically questionable
strategies; 25 (3) possess unrealistic expectations about the success or value of
a controversy; 26 and (4) have terminated former counsel. 27 Lawyers should
learn the circumstances surrounding the termination or withdrawal of former
counsel in hope of avoiding a similar fate. On the other hand, the client’s
willingness to honestly communicate and listen to the lawyer and consider his
or her advice are important traits favoring the lawyer’s acceptance of
employment. 28 Clients need to understand that effective communication is a
two-way street and that the client bears some of the responsibility for ensuring
good communication. A client should apprise the lawyer of any material
changes in the client’s personal and professional life that may affect the
representation—ranging from the client’s change of address to his or her
discovery of relevant information or evidence. The lawyer also should note
any questions the lawyer has about the client’s personality that pose a risk to
the firm and that warrant additional investigation. 29

23. See Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18, at 5 (noting that “[m]any entertainment lawyers rely on
referrals for their services from . . . previous clients, lawyers, agents, managers and personnel with
entertainment companies” and cautioning lawyers not to provide compensation of any kind for the
referral).
24. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 87-88.
25. Id. A good example of clients requesting lawyers to pursue a questionable ethical strategy
involves an artist pressuring the lawyer who is negotiating a deal on his behalf to exaggerate the
interest by competitors in acquiring the artist-client’s services in hope of starting a bidding war for the
artist-client’s services. Lawyers need to inform clients that although some commercial puffery is
generally permitted, lawyers cannot make any misrepresentations during the deal negotiations. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 4.1(a) (2007) (prohibiting a lawyer from
knowingly “mak[ing] a false statement of material fact or law to a third person”) and (b) (prohibiting
a lawyer from knowingly “fail[ing] to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by
rule 1.6”).
26. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, THE LAWYER’S
DESK GUIDE TO PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 56 (1999) [hereinafter ABA STANDING
COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY].
27. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 89.
28. Id. § 2.7, at 88; see also, NELSON, supra note 15, at 78-82. Honest and full communication
with the lawyer is promoted by educating the client about the attorney-client evidentiary privilege and
the lawyer’s ethical obligation to protect information relating to representation. It is important that
the lawyer discuss these concepts and his or her limitations with the client as soon as possible.
29. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 88.

SAHL (DO NOT DELETE)

384

5/21/2010 2:07 PM

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:2

Fourth, the lawyer should consider the client’s financial background to
determine the sources and level of financial support for the representation.
Information concerning a client’s outstanding and potential debts as well as a
list of the entertainment client’s assets may help the lawyer understand
possible financial constraints to the representation. 30
Fifth, the lawyer should investigate whether the firm can competently
represent the client. 31 The firm may have to expend resources to develop or
enhance its competency before undertaking representation—including the
hiring of experienced lawyers or support staff, or attending a continuing
education program in the field. 32 Even after representation has begun, the law
firm may need to enhance its competency. For example, the law firms
representing the music industry in the well-known copyright infringement
case, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 33 added a team of partners and several
associates—including the hiring of former United States Solicitor General Ken
Starr as co-counsel—once the parties decided to seek Supreme Court
review. 34
Sixth, the lawyer needs to consider what, if any, possible ethical or
business conflicts of interest might arise that could cause a loss of business to
the firm. 35 This consideration militates against a lawyer hastily accepting a
new client or matter without adequate time to reflect upon possible conflicts,
especially in the context of a large firm where the lawyer may need to consult
with several colleagues. The consultation may take several days and require

30. See id.; see also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18, at 5 (noting that lawyers often represent
entertainment clients on a contingency fee basis because of their clients’ limited financial resources).
31. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 88. Model Rule 1.1’s competency standard
requires lawyers who are also sports agents to be knowledgeable about sports. See Konn, supra note
6, at 15; see also David S. Caudill, Revisiting the Ethics of Representing Professional Athletes:
Agents, “Attorney-Agents,” Full-Service Agencies and the Dream Team Model, 3 VA. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 31, 40-41 (2003); see generally David S. Caudill, Sports and Entertaiment Agents and
Agent-Attorneys: Discourses and Conventions Concerning Crossing Jurisdictional and Professional
Borders, 43 AKRON L REV. ___, __(2010) (discussing competency and other ethical issues regarding
non-attorney sports agents and attorney-sports agents involved in cross-border representation of
atheletes).
32. Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 3. Lawyers should attend continuing legal education programs
in the entertainment field to help ensure they provide competent representation. Id.
33. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).
34. Susan Butler, Legal Matters: Supreme Team, BILLBOARD, July 9, 2005.
35. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 88. For example, a lawyer who defends a record
company regarding employment matters may not be precluded ethically from representing a plaintiff
in a wrongful termination of employment action against another record company. However, as a
business matter, the lawyer’s current record company-client may not want the lawyer to represent the
plaintiff against the second record company because the lawyer might establish precedent that could
harm the current record company-client in some future employee dispute.
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the lawyer to send a firm-wide memo identifying the proposed employment.
Lawyers should inform clients that their professional code of ethics may
preclude them from accepting employment where a conflict of interest exists
in certain circumstances. This approach provides two benefits to lawyers: it
gives the lawyer time to step back and reflect upon whether the lawyer should
accept employment, and also underscores to the layperson that the lawyer’s
professional services are governed by a code of professional norms.
Finally, entertainment lawyers must remember that accepting client
representation may be dangerous to their professional well-being. Refusing an
offer of employment may represent the best business and personal decision
that a lawyer makes all year. Even after accepting employment, lawyers still
need to be prepared to say “no” to clients. For example, a lawyer should reject
a vindictive client’s insistence that the lawyer adopt a “scorch and burn”
strategy in litigation or engage in unethical behavior.
III. BUSINESS DEALINGS WITH CLIENTS
Given the highly competitive and entrepreneurial nature of the
entertainment business, it is not surprising that lawyers have opportunities to
become involved with their clients’ businesses. 36 Significant risk often
accompanies a lawyer’s decision to enter into business transactions with a
client. A disgruntled client-partner may be likely to file a grievance with the
bar’s disciplinary authority or institute a malpractice action against the
lawyer. 37 A lawyer may be subject to third-party suits, such as those filed by
investors in the business who feel harmed by the lawyer’s actions. A business
venture with a client may also create conflicts of interest with the lawyer’s
current or future clients that could result in a loss of business for the lawyer.
The first step to avoiding the problems intrinsic to lawyer-client business
transactions is to be sure to recognize them. There are generally two types of

36. See Kenneth J. Abdo & Jack P. Sahl, Entertainment Law Ethics, in ENTERTAINMENT,
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 149-50 (R. Thorne ed. 2004-05).
37. See generally e.g., In re Stover, 104 P.3d 394 (Kan. 2005). In Stover, the attorney was
disbarred in part for acquiring an ownership interest that was adverse to her client. Attorney Kathy
Stover offered to serve as a business manager and attorney for Michael Jahnz, a musician. Stover
created websites that used Jahnz’s name and likeness without obtaining Jahnz’s written permission.
Stover refused to remove the websites after Jahnz terminated Stover’s representation. The Kansas
Supreme Court held that Stover had “acquired an interest adverse to the Jahnzes by creating websites
that used Michael’s name and likeness without his written permission” and that this violated Rule
1.8(a) of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC). Id. at 838. The rule prohibits a lawyer
from “knowingly acquir[ing] an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to
the client unless . . . the client consents in writing thereto.” Id.; see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.8(a) (providing ethical standards the equivalent of KRPC 1.8).
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lawyer-client business transactions. 38 The first type stems from the subject
matter of the lawyer’s representation for the client, such as when a music
lawyer and his or her artist-client each contribute fifty percent of the start up
capital for a recording company. The second type of lawyer-client business
transaction may be entirely unrelated to the subject matter of the
representation—for example, when a music-lawyer who represents his or her
artist-client only in entertainment matters becomes a partner with the client in
a real estate venture. 39 Both types of client-business transactions raise
important questions about the lawyer’s loyalty to the client and are governed
by each state’s lawyer code of conduct. The fear is that the lawyer’s selfinterest in the joint business enterprise with the client will undermine the
lawyer’s ability to exercise independent judgment on behalf of the client.
Model Rule 1.8(a) of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct lists specific requirements a lawyer-client business
transaction must meet to avoid an ethical violation. 40 First, the lawyer must
ensure that the transaction and terms are fair and reasonable to the client and
are fully disclosed in writing in a manner understood by the client. Second,
the lawyer must inform the client in writing about seeking independent advice
regarding the transaction and provide the client with a reasonable opportunity
to procure such advice. 41 Third, the lawyer must procure the client’s written
38. See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
58 (identifying several forms of “Inappropriate Involvement in Client Interests,” such as “[a]cting as a
director or officer of a client company[,] [i]nvesting in client securities[,] [b]ecoming involved in oneto-one business deals with a client[,] [a]ccepting stock from a client in lieu of a cash fee[,] [a]greeing
to contingent cash fees[,][and] [s]oliciting other investors on behalf of a client’s enterprise”). Id.
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, AT R. 1.8(a) cmt. 1. Comment 1
provides another example of a client-lawyer business transaction unrelated to the subject matter of the
representation: a lawyer, preparing a will for a client, learns that the client needs money for a matter
unrelated to the subject of the representation, and the lawyer loans the money to the client. Id.
40. Although not completely coextensive, DR 5-104(A) is the Code’s counterpart to Rule 1.8(a).
DR 5-104 (A) provides: “A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they
have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional
judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the client has consented after full disclosure.”
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at DR 5-104(A); see id. at EC 5-3
(cautioning lawyers from accepting or continuing employment when some interest interferes with the
lawyer’s ability to exercise independent judgment on behalf of his client); see also id. at EC 5-5
(noting that lawyers should not suggest to the client that he make a gift to the lawyer).
41. See generally Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Croce, the widow of
the late songwriter and singer, Jim Croce, sought damages from several defendants, including Kurnit,
who was an entertainment lawyer. Kurnit was introduced to the Croces by the other defendants as
“the lawyer.” Id. at 887, 889. Kurnit outlined the terms of the recording, publishing, and
management contracts that were executed by the Croces. Id. The parties never negotiated the terms
of the contracts. Id. at 887. Kurnit was a shareholder and participant in the management and
publishing businesses that signed the Croces. Id. Although the court found that the Croces were not
Kurnit’s clients, it held that they reasonably relied on Kurnit’s explanation of the “legal
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and informed consent, signed by the client, to all the essential terms of the
agreement, including the lawyer’s role in the transaction and whether the
lawyer is representing the client in the transaction. 42 The lawyer may need to
seek additional informed consent waivers regarding the same transaction if
new circumstances create conflicts of interest unknown to the client when he
last consented to the lawyer’s involvement. Even if a lawyer-client business
transaction is not a “per se” violation of the ethical rules, ethical and unethical
behavior is a thin line that the lawyer may cross inadvertently. 43 The lawyer
who engages in a lawyer-client business transaction that complies with the
requirements of Model Rule 1.8(a) still must ensure that he or she maintains
“independent professional judgment” as required under Model Rule 2.1, and
avoid any conflicts of interest between the lawyer and client. 44
Lawyers and their firms need to remember that developing a good
professional relationship with a client requires work. 45 The maintenance of
that relationship becomes even more challenging when it also becomes a
business relationship. 46 Before a lawyer agrees to enter into a business
transaction with a client, a comprehensive client and subject matter-screening
process is key. 47 Every business transaction with a client contains some risk,
ramifications” of the contracts. Id. at 890. This explanation together with his introduction as “the
lawyer,” his interest as a principal in the transactions, “the Croces lack of independent
representation,” and the failure of the Croces to have independent counsel, created a fiduciary duty
between the Croces and Kurnit. Id. This duty required Kurnit to act fairly and to advise the Croces to
obtain independent advice about the contracts with the defendants. Id. at 893-94. However, Kurnit
never advised the Croces to seek independent counsel. Id. As a result, the court ruled that Kurnit
breached his fiduciary duty to the Croces and was liable for their legal fees. Id.; see also, Abdo &
Sahl, supra note 1, at 5 n.30 (explaining that Croce inspired entertainment lawyers to include an
acknowledgement provision in contracts that the artist was advised to seek independent counsel).
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.8(a) cmt. 3 (reporting, in
part, that “[t]he risk to the client is [the] greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent the
client in the transaction itself or when the lawyer’s financial interest otherwise poses a significant risk
that the lawyer’s representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer’s financial
interest in the transaction,” and noting that Model Rule 1.7 may preclude the lawyer from “seeking
the client’s consent to the transaction”).
43. Jodi Brandenburg & David Coher, Going for the Gold: Equity Stakes in Corporate Clients,
14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1179, 1193 (2001).
44. Id. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.7 cmt. 1 & 6
(emphasizing that “independent judgment [is] [an] essential element[ ] in the lawyer’s relationship to
a client;” noting that the “lawyer’s own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on
representation of a client;” and warning that “[i]f the probity of a lawyer’s own conduct in a
transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult if not impossible for the lawyer to give the client
detached advice”).
45. See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
186.
46. Id.
47. See supra, Part I.
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but the lawyer can better assess the magnitude of the risk by thoroughly
screening the client and matter beforehand. 48 If a lawyer accepts the risk and
becomes his or her client’s business partner, the lawyer’s firm should take
steps to protect itself. A firm should require an attorney who wants to engage
in a business transaction with a client to discuss the situation with a partner in
the firm. 49 Even in a sole-proprietorship situation, the lawyer should consult
an independent attorney before entering into a business transaction with a
client. 50 Firms should make sure that the business transaction between the
attorney and the client is clearly and fully memorialized in writing, such as in
the engagement letter or in a separate document. Additionally, a firm should
not allow the attorney who is entering into a business transaction with a client
to provide legal advice regarding the business transaction. 51
Lawyers may become the subject of third-party claims when they become
involved with the business activities of their clients. When clients’ business
activities fail, investors and others who have experienced financial loss may
look to the lawyer for compensation. 52 When a lawyer is involved in business
transactions with the client, outsiders do not perceive the lawyer as
independent from the client, but rather view the lawyer as having great power
and influence over the client. 53 This perception has caused malpractice
insurance carriers to exclude from professional-liability coverage those
lawyers who are directors and officers of their clients’ business enterprises. 54
Difficulties also arise when lawyers forego a cash fee and instead acquire
an interest in clients’ businesses. 55 The difficulties include speculation as to
possible undue influence by the lawyer in obtaining stock or other interests

48. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 95.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (recommending that if the lawyer in the transaction provides legal advice, it should be
“reviewed and approved in advance by a disinterested partner in the firm”).
52. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
189.
53. Id. at 180. See also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 18, at 3 (explaining that, due to the merging
roles of lawyer, manager, and agent, entertainment lawyers “intentionally or inadvertently exercise a
greater degree of control over the client than is customary in other law practices”).
54. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
182; see also JAY G. FOONBERG, HOW TO START & BUILD A LAW PRACTICE 471-72 (2d ed. 1999).
55. See generally Brandenburg & Coher, supra note 43. In an effort to obtain higher profits,
lawyers have begun investing in the initial public offerings of clients. Id. at 1179. Although
receiving an equity stake in a client is not new, the vast amount of potential profits for lawyers is new.
Id. at 1179-80; see also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that a lawyer may accept an
ownership interest in literary property when representing a client in transactions related to the
property).
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instead of a fee, the reasonable amount the lawyer should pay for the interest,
the lack of independence a lawyer has once the lawyer gains an equity interest
in the client, and other conflict of interest concerns, such as whether the
lawyer must withdraw from representation. 56 Generally, once the lawyer
owns an interest in the client’s business, it becomes increasingly difficult for
the lawyer to maintain independent judgment because of the lawyer’s financial
interest. 57 This belief stems in part from the observation that “[t]he more ties
you have, the more questions people may raise.” 58
IV. SCOPE OF RETENTION
Lawyers can minimize the risk of a malpractice claim by ensuring that
clients understand the scope of representation. Lawyers must orally explain
the nature and terms of the professional relationship in a manner readily
understood by their clients. Lawyers should also have a written engagement
letter to help ensure that both the lawyer and the client clearly understand the
purpose, nature, and scope of the lawyer’s and client’s responsibilities. 59 The
engagement letter should clearly identify the client, including the client’s
proper legal name when the client is a business. 60 Lawyers should be
sensitive to third-party liability when signing an engagement letter with a
client. 61
56. Brandenburg & Coher, supra note 43, at 1181 (citing Debra Baker, Who Wants to be a
Millionaire?, 86 A.B.A. J. 36 (2000)).
57. Id. at 1189. The article suggests that although lawyers should instruct clients to seek outside
counsel before issuing the stock to the lawyer, this suggestion is often unrealistic because a client
offering an equity share in itself probably lacks the money to hire another lawyer to review the deal.
Id. at 1183.
58. Id. at 1182 (quoting John F. Olson, chair of the ABA Business Law Section’s Committee on
Lawyer Business Ethics).
59. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.9, at 96. See Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 3-4.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all of the contents of an engagement letter, a
lawyer should include in any engagement letter a provision that describes the grounds and process for
the lawyer’s withdrawal from representation.
60. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.9, at 98.
61. See generally Even Street Prods. v. Shkat Arrow Hafer & Weber, LLP, No.643 F.Supp. 2d
317 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (the spelling of the law firm’s name in the case heading of the reported decision
differs from the spelling in the text of the opinion). In 2000, New York Times Television and
Diamond Time Ltd., produced a documentary about Sly Stone titled “Jimi and Sly: The Skin I’m In.”
Id. at 320. That same year Showtime Networks broadcasted the documentary. The production used
Sly Stone’s music without authorization of the copyright holders, Sony and Warner/Chappell
(Warner). Id. Sony and Warner retained Shukat, Arrow, Hafer & Webber, LLP (Shukat) to prosecute
a copyright infringement action. The Shukat firm entered into a written agreement with the New
York Times Television attorneys to toll the statute of limitations in hope of reaching a settlement. Id.
That agreement expired and Sony and Warner were barred from suing for copyright infringement.
Sony and Warner assigned to the plaintiff, Even Street Productions (Even), all of the rights and
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The engagement letter should state clearly the basis and amount of the
lawyer’s fee. 62 The letter also should address other financial issues, including
the advancement of expenses, the computation of interest on outstanding
balances, special firm charges (e.g. copying and delivery of documents), and
billing procedures. 63 The engagement letter also should identify the client’s
interests of Sly Stone’s musical career. Id. at 319-20. Even expected to benefit from a resolution of
the copyright infringement claims, which Sony and Warner could no longer bring because they were
barred by the statute of limitations. Even also had separate agreements with Sony and Warner that
assigned and transferred any and all claims or causes of action Sony and Warner had against any third
party. Even sued Shukat for legal malpractice. The court denied the law firm’s motion to dismiss and
held that Even could sue Shukat for legal malpractice. The court determined that Even’s agreements
with Sony and Warner could be reasonably construed as assigning not only copyright claims but also
legal malpractice claims. See also Phillip M. Callesen & James W. May, Potential Legal Opinion
Liability for Ohio Business Lawyers, 23 THE OHIO LAWYER 13, 15 (Jan./Feb. 2009) (discussing
liability for lawyers who provide opinions to clients that are relied on by third parties, and reviewing
Dean Foods v. Arthur J. Pappathanasi, 18 Mass. L. Rep. 598 (2004), a case that resulted in a $7.2
million judgment against a seller’s law firm for negligent misrepresentation in issuing a legal opinion
for the sale of a business). Id.
62. See generally King v. Fox, 418 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2005), for a recent entertainment law case
involving a dispute over a fee agreement. Edward King was a member of the Southern rock band,
Lynyrd Skynyrd, from 1972 to 1975. Id. at 124. After MCA Records and the band refused to pay
King his artist royalties, King hired attorney Lawrence Fox. Id. at 124-25. Due to King’s limited
resources, Fox—who specialized in personal injury cases—agreed to represent King on a contingency
fee basis. Id. The brief, written agreement stated that Fox was entitled to one-third of “any money
recovered from” MCA Records. Id. at 125. On King’s behalf, Fox secured a settlement with MCA
Records related only to King’s artist royalties. Fox then relied on the written contingency fee
agreement to obtain one-third of King’s writer royalties as well as his artist royalties—even though
Fox never represented King in writer royalty matters. Id. at 126. King sued Fox for malpractice,
alleging in part that the terms of the contingency fee agreement were unconscionable. The federal
district court granted summary judgment to Fox, finding that the terms were within a reasonable
range, that Fox clearly explained the terms of the agreement to King, and that King ratified Fox’s
conduct. King v. Fox, No. 917 CIV 4134, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 462, at **12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21,
2004). On appeal, the Second Circuit certified three questions to the New York Court of Appeals on
the issue of whether King ratified Fox’s potentially unconscionable conduct. King, 418 F.3d at 137.
The New York Court of Appeals answered all three questions affirmatively but with significant
qualifications. King v. Fox, 51 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (2006). First, the court held that a ratification of
an attorney’s fee agreement can occur during a period of continuous representation “so long as the
client has full knowledge of the relevant facts and has acquiesced.” Id. at 1191. Second, the court
held that a ratification of an attorney’s fee agreement can occur during a period of continuous
representation even if attorney misconduct occurs during that period so long as the client’s
acquiescence is not obtained as a result of the misconduct. Id. Third, the court held that a ratification
of an attorney’s fee agreement that might otherwise be considered voidable as unconscionable can
occur if the client is fully informed, has equal bargaining power, and knowingly and voluntarily
affirms an existing fee arrangement with “both a full understanding of the facts that made the
agreement voidable and knowledge of his or her rights as a client.” Id. at 1192.
63. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.9, at 101-02; see also ABA CENTER FOR PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 61-75 (5th ed. 2003). See
generally Rachel Abramowitz, Birkhead Gets Tentative Ruling Against Ex-Attorney, L.A. TIMES,
July 13, 2007, at E2 (discussing, in part, the misunderstandings and fee dispute between Attorney
Debra Opri and her former client, Larry Birkhead, who claimed to have fathered Anna Nicole Smith’s
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responsibilities, such as notifying the lawyer of any material changes that may
affect the lawyer’s work. 64 In multiple-client settings, lawyers should at a
minimum inform all clients in writing about the effect of joint representation
on the attorney-client privilege. 65 In addition to a written document outlining
the rights and responsibilities of both the lawyer and the client, the lawyer
should discuss these matters with the client to ensure that the client truly
understands the representation agreement. 66
The engagement letter also should clearly state the scope of the lawyer’s
authority. Under Model Rule 1.2, the client has authority to settle a case. 67
The engagement letter should expressly identify to what extent, if any, the

daughter; Birkhead sued Opri for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and malpractice). The California
Bar Association also investigated Opri’s conduct. Id.
64. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 54.
65. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.9, at 99. The representation of multiple clients also
presents conflict of interest issues. See Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that some
commentators believe that lawyers should refuse to simultaneously represent an artist and a manager
in negotiating their artist-management agreement because of conflict of interest concerns) (citing Jack
P. Sahl, Professor of Law and Faculty Dir. of the Miller-Becker Ctr. for Prof’l Responsibility at the
Univ. of Akron School of Law, Presentation at the 12th Annual International Folk Alliance
Conference: Ethics for Entertainment Lawyers: Avoiding Conflicts of Interest (Feb. 11, 2000). See
Bolton v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 798 N.Y.S.2d 343 (N.Y. 2004), for an example of a client feeling
betrayed in the context of multiple representation,. The plaintiff, the singer Michael Bolton, sued his
lawyers, Weil, Gotshal, & Manges (WGM) for breaching its fiduciary duties in representing him in a
copyright action brought by Three Brothers Action. Id. Bolton contended that WGM failed (1) to
advise him of conflicts of interests arising from WGM’s joint representation of Bolton, his record
company (Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.), and his publishing company (Warner-Chappell Ltd.), and
(2) to advise him of settlement developments or follow his instructions regarding settlement. Id. at
345. Bolton argued that WGM did not discuss with him his indemnity obligations to his publishing
and record companies and did not inform him of favorable settlement offers. Id. at 2-3.; see generally
Bolton v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1899 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)
(denying a motion by Bolton’s former personal lawyers, Epstein, Levinsohn, Bodine, Hurwitz &
Weinstein, to dismiss a third-party complaint against them, and permitting a claim for contribution
against them by WGM); Anthony Lin, Singer Sues Weil, Gotshal & Manges Over Joint
Representation, 230 N.Y. L. J. 1, Dec. 22, 2003 (reporting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld a jury award of $5.4 million against Bolton, his co-writer, music publisher and
record company for copyright infringement, and noting that Bolton sued WGM for $30 million in
damages alleging that the firm “was conflicted” when it defended him and other parties).
66. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 54.
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.2. The Code counterpart to Rule
1.2 is EC 7-7 (emphasizing that the ultimate authority to accept a settlement rests with the client). See
also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at EC 7-8 (explaining that a lawyer
should ensure that the client makes informed decisions, and should defer to the client when the client
decides “to forego legally available objectives”). See generally id. at DR 7-101(A)(1) (providing that
a lawyer must not intentionally fail to seek the client’s lawful objectives); Id. at DR 7-101(A)(2)
(stating that lawyers must “not fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for
professional services,” but noting that lawyers may withdraw pursuant to DR 2-110) (emphasis
added).
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client delegates settlement authority to the lawyer. 68 A lawyer should be
aware that even if there is an agreement granting the lawyer authority to
engage in settlement discussions with the other side, this does not mean that
the lawyer has authority to actually accept or reject settlement offers. 69 If the
lawyer wants specific settlement authority, the lawyer should discuss the
matter with the client and obtain written authorization. 70 Even if the client
grants specific settlement authority, it is generally wise to communicate the
settlement offer to the client prior to the lawyer accepting or rejecting it. 71
The engagement letter needs to describe the goals of representation—
particularly in an entertainment law practice, where the lawyer often performs
different roles. 72 It is important that the entertainment lawyer listen to the
client’s wishes in establishing the goals of representation. If the representation
involves litigation, the client may want to settle a case early or may want to
explore alternatives to litigation, such as arbitration or mediation. The lawyer
should have a clear understanding of the client’s objectives at the beginning of
representation so that he or she can devise and implement a plan to achieve
them. 73 A clear understanding of the client’s expectations at the start of the

68. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.9, at 99. The lawyer’s settlement authority must be
specific. Id. Even if a client grants a lawyer settlement authority in an engagement letter, the lawyer
should be mindful that subsequent client instructions can override this authority. Id. (citing Lewis v.
Uselton, 416 S.E.2d 94, 97 (Ga. 1992) (holding that although an engagement letter granted the lawyer
“full ‘power and authority to settle,’” the lawyer’s acceptance of a $22,500 settlement offer was
unauthorized when the clients told the attorney they did not want to settle for anything under
$50,000)).
69. Auvil v. Grafton Homes, Inc., 92 F.3d 226, 230 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[t]he authority
to negotiate . . . is far different from the authority to agree to a specific settlement.”); Johnson v.
Schmitz, 237 F. Supp. 2d 183, 192 (Dist. Conn. 2002) (stating that authority to enter into negotiations
is not the same as authority to agree to a settlement).
70. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.4 cmt. 2. “A lawyer who
receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea
bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has
previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer
to accept or reject an offer.” See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14,
at DR 5-106. Although there is no direct counterpart in the Code to Rule 1.4, DR 5-106 suggests that
a lawyer should not make an aggregate settlement on behalf of multiple clients unless each client has
consented to the settlement after being fully advised of important details. Id.
71. “A lawyer should provide a client with a professional assessment of the advantages and
disadvantages of a proposed settlement, so that the client can make a fully-informed decision about
settlement. Any effort to assist the client in reaching a decision should avoid interference with the
client’s ultimate decision-making authority.” ABA ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT
NEGOTIATIONS, 3.2.4 (2002).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
73. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 54.
The attorney must consult with his or her client to clearly determine “the client’s desired results.” See
Renee A. Pistone, Case Studies: The Ways to Achieve More Effective Negotiations, 7 PEPP. DISP.
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attorney-client relationship also permits the lawyer to address any
unreasonable expectations.
A lawyer’s representation of a client generally includes “(1) gathering
facts, (2) advising the client, (3) discovering facts of the opposing party, (4)
researching the law, (5) drafting correspondence and documents, (6)
negotiating, and (7) representing the client in court.” 74 However, the lawyer
and client may agree to limit the representation by excluding some of the
services that lawyers generally provide. 75 For example, a lawyer may agree to
negotiate a publishing contract for an author but decline to shop the author’s
work to other publishing companies, review the work for possible defamation,
or counsel the client regarding the tax consequences of forming a corporation.
A client might prefer limited representation because the client has limited
objectives or cannot afford all of the services generally included in full
representation. 76
Before a lawyer agrees to limit the scope of the representation, the lawyer
needs to confirm that limiting the scope is reasonable under the
circumstances. 77 To determine whether limiting the scope is reasonable, the
lawyer should evaluate: the complexity of the case, transaction, or other
matter; the importance of the matter; the judge or jury’s discretion in
reviewing the matter; how the dispute will be resolved; and other resources the
client might have to aid in representation. 78
Clients who agree to limited representation tend to be happy with the
results, as evidenced in part by the low rate of malpractice claims against
limited-assistance attorneys. 79 This may be because limited representation is
RESOL. L. J. 425, 445 (2007). In choosing which strategy to employ the attorney needs to consider
what [his or] her client’s hopes and fears are.” Id. at 459. The attorney must conduct negotiations in
the way that comports with the client’s desired ends. Id. at 445.
74. MARK H. TOUHEY III ET AL., HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE 2 n.6
(2002) (quoting Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 FAM. L.Q.
421, 422-23 (1994)).
75. Id. at 2.
76. Id. at 2-7.
77. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.2 cmt. 7.
78. TOUHEY III, supra note 73, at 59. “[T]he best candidates for limited scope assistance have a
degree of emotional detachment, the willingness and ability to handle ‘some paperwork,’ some
capacity to gather and analyze financial information, reasonable decisiveness, willingness and ability
to handle details and follow through on obligations, and the necessary time to perform delegated
tasks.” Id. (citing M. SUE TALIA, A CLIENT’S GUIDE TO LIMITED LEGAL SERVICES xiii (1997)). As
the complexity of the issues increase, so does the need for lawyer support and advice. Id. at 59. For
example, the lawyer would need to provide more legal services in the case of a divorce involving
custody disputes and division of pension plans than in an uncontested divorce where no children or
significant property is involved. Id.
79. See id. at 51. “[T]here are fewer rather than more malpractice claims when lawyers
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more client-centered than full representation. 80 Limited representation often
provides the client with a high degree of control over his or her legal affairs
and offers a more affordable price than with full representation where the
client is expected to surrender his money and control to the lawyer—giving
him or her “all [of] the responsibility.” 81 It is important to remember,
however, that the decision to limit the scope of representation does not excuse
the lawyer’s obligation to provide competent representation. 82
V. TIME LIMITATIONS AND CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
Lawyer codes of conduct provide different conflict of interest rules
depending on whether the lawyer is representing a current client against
another current client, or instead, a current client against a former client. 83
Thus, the point in time at which a person is no longer a current client has
major consequences for the lawyer. Consequently, in both current and former
client situations, lawyers need to understand the timing aspects of the attorneyclient relationship.
Model Rule 1.7 addresses conflicts between current clients. As a general
rule, a lawyer cannot represent a client if the representation will be “directly
adverse to another client” or if the representation would “materially limit” the
lawyer’s representation of another client. 84 However, under Model Rule 1.7
unbundled services.” Id. (quoting Leigh P. Perkins, Unbundling Your Services Makes Some Clients
Happy, LAWS. WKLY USA, Dec. 18, 1995).
80. See NELSON, supra note 15, at 27-40. As purveyors of services, lawyers must be “clientcentered as well as case-oriented” and also describing a “client-centered orientation” as one where the
lawyers “gather as much information as [they] can about how [their] clients see their situations, and
factoring that information into the solutions [they] design for them.” Id. at 27.
81. TOUHEY III, supra note 73, at 52 (citing MICHAEL A. CANE, WELCOME TO THE
INFORMATION HIGHWAY, in THE CHANGING FACE OF LEGAL PRACTICE: A NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON “UNBUNDLED” LEGAL SERVICES 2 (Vol. 4 2000).
82. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.2 cmt. 7. See also Fred C.
Zacharias, Limited Performance Agreements: Should Clients Get What They Pay For?, 11 GEO J.
LEGAL ETHICS 915, 915-16 (1998) (noting that although clients may seek limited representation for
various reasons, “legal ethics norms expect lawyers to maximize their clients’ positions, regardless of
whether the clients pay them to do so”).
83. The Code’s conflict of interest provisions are found at DR 5-101 and DR 5-105. Unlike the
Model Rules, the Code does not have a provision expressly dealing with conflicts involving former
clients. Code jurisdictions nevertheless followed the “substantial relationship” test as first formulated
by the courts for resolving conflicts involving former clients. See infra notes 90-93 and
accompanying text (discussing the substantial relationship test).
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.7(a) (1)–(2) cf. MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPSONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at EC 5-15 (exhorting that “a lawyer should never represent
in litigation multiple clients with differing interest” but noting that a lawyer may represent multiple
clients in non-litigation matters only if their interests vary slightly); Id. at DR 5-105(B) (prohibiting a
lawyer from “represent[ing] multiple clients if doing so will adversely affect the representation”). It
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(b)(1)-(4), even if a conflict exists with another current client, the lawyer can
still represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able
to provide competent and diligent representation to each
affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim
by one client against another client represented by the lawyer
in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal;
and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing. 85
Even after following the steps in Model Rule 1.7 (b)(1)-(4), a lawyer
should be wary about representing current clients with adverse interests. For
example, even if the lawyer can show the representation was not prohibited by
law, that it did not involve a claim brought by one client against another client
in the same proceeding, and that each client gave informed consent in writing,
the lawyer still has to prove that he reasonably believed he could provide
is worth noting that conflicts of interest are common in the entertainment industry. At least one wellknow entertainment lawyer has gone so far as to suggest that, “[a]nyone that does not have conflicts is
not a player in Hollywood.” Adam Sandler, Legal Eagles Swoop Down on Hollywood Suit: Conflict
of Interest: Latest Legal Scuffle, VARIETY, Aug. 28, 1995. The New York Times reported that the
prominent entertainment lawyer, Bert Fields, “has drawn some heat in Hollywood for simultaneously
representing both talent and studios.” See Allison Hope Weiner, Telling Hollywood It’s Out of Order,
N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, at I7. Fields said that after he discloses the conflict to his clients, “[t]hey
usually think it’s a great advantage.” See id.; see also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 3-4 (noting that
sometimes the “package deal”—where a lawyer simultaneously represents a successful movie
producer and a famous actor—may result in a lucrative production in which “[e]veryone wins”).
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.7(b)(1)-(4) cf. CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at DR 5-105(C) (stating that in situations covered in DR 5-105 (A) (a
lawyer shall not accept proffered employment if his independent judgment is likely to be adversely
affected) and (B) (a lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if his independent judgment on
behalf of one client is adversely affected by representation of another client), a lawyer “may represent
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each” and each
consents after full disclosure to the representation). See generally id. at EC 5-17 (providing that
before a lawyer represents multiple clients in a non-litigation matter, the lawyer “should explain fully
to each client the implications of the common representation and should accept or continue
employment only if the clients consent”). The Model Rules make it clear now that the lawyer may
not “represent both Client A and B in the case of A v. B.” RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S.
DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 28081 (2005). It is also clear “that Rule 1.7 does not absolutely prohibit a lawyer from representing
adverse parties outside of the litigation context . . . if the lawyer secures an adequate waiver.” Id. at
282.
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competent and diligent representation to each client. If lawyers are not
careful, they may find themselves in the middle of a disqualification
proceeding. 86 In many cases, the lawyer’s belief that such competent and
diligent representation was possible will not be reasonable by the very fact that
the lawyer is representing one client against another. 87 When representing
two clients against each other, there is a substantial risk that one or both will
feel betrayed, in part, because of the fear that the lawyer failed to zealously
pursue a client’s interests. 88
When a current client no longer employs a lawyer, the client becomes a
former client. The timing of when a current client becomes a former client is
not always clear. Nevertheless, a lawyer owes former clients certain ethical
duties. Model Rule 1.9 identifies these obligations and provides that a lawyer
cannot represent a client against a former client in “the same or a substantially
related matter” when the client’s interests are “materially adverse to the
interests of the former client,” unless the former client gives informed written
consent. 89 When a new matter is the same or substantially similar, it is
generally assumed that the lawyer gained confidences relevant to the new

86. See Mary Flood, Hardin Stays as Clemens’ Attorney/Judge Says Issue of Representation
Excludes McNamee, HOUSTON CHRON., May 7, 2008 at 5. In the instant case, the judge ultimately
allowed Attorney Rusty Hardin to continue to represent Roger Clemens in his defamation suit against
Brian McNamee. Id. McNamee lacked standing to seek Hardin’s disqualification because he had
represented Andy Pettitte, not McNamee. Pettitte was Clemens’ former teammate and a potential
defense witness in the same defamation case. Id. “Richard Emery, one of McNamee’s New York
City-based lawyers, said . . . the judge acknowledged that Hardin [did] something unethical because
the court implied that if Pettitte asks to have Hardin removed, the judge may do that.” Id.
87. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.7(b)(1).
88. See id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 6 cf. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at EC 5-16
(providing that a lawyer should advise multiple clients of any “circumstance that might cause multiple
clients to question the undivided loyalty of the lawyer”).
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.9(a) cf. CODE OF PROF’L
CONDUCT EC 4-6 (requiring a lawyer to preserve the confidences of a client after the termination of
employment). This obligation generally precludes a lawyer from representing an interest adverse to
that of a former client in a substantially related matter. See Spivey v. Bender, 601 N.E.2d 56, 59
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991); see also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 5. In the case of Fargnoli v. Ziffren,
Brittenham & Branca, Fargnoli, Case No BC068280 (1992 L.A. Sup. Ct.,—a former manager for
Prince—was previously represented by the defendant law firm. Alex Citron & Robert W. Welkos,
Hollywood Firm Sued Again, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1992, at D1. The law firm later represented
Prince when Fargnoli sued the entertainer. Id. Fargnoli alleged that the firm had disclosed
confidential communications to Prince. Id. The court granted summary judgment to the law firm,
noting that a written release precluded Fargnoli’s conflict of interest claims. See James Bates, Judge
Dismisses Suit by Prince’s Ex-Manager, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at D2. For example, a sports
agent representing two players on the same team in a sport where there are salary caps will have to
sacrifice the interests of one client for the other in most cases, as players are “competing for a finite
resource.” Neiman supra note 6 at 15. Such conduct by sports lawyer-agents would violate Model
Rule 1.7’s conflict of interest standard.
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matter. 90 Additionally, even if the lawyer is representing a client against a
former client in a matter that is not substantially similar, the lawyer cannot use
information gained during the former representation against the former client
unless the client consents. 91
Although Model Rule 1.9 limits a lawyer’s ability to represent a current
client against a former client, Model Rule 1.9 is not as restrictive as Model
Rule 1.7. Model Rule 1.9’s substantial relationship test reflects a concern for
protecting clients’ loyalties and confidences, but it also reflects other
competing policy concerns. Those concerns include lawyer mobility and the
desire for clients to hire the lawyer of their own choosing. 92 In 2009, the
90. See Donald R. McMinn, Note: ABA Formal Opinion 88-356: New Justification for Increased
Use of Screening Devices to Avert Attorney Disqualification, 65 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1231, 1250 (1990);
see also Spivey, 601 N.E.2d at 59 (explaining that when the lawyer represents a client whose interests
are adverse to that of a former client, there is a concern that the lawyer obtained confidential
information during the representation (citing Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980)).
Some courts take the position that where no confidential information was revealed during the former
representation, there is no conflict of interest barring representation of a new client. See generally
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978).
The determination of whether there is a substantial relationship turns on the possibility, or
appearance thereof, that confidential information might have been given to the attorney in
relation to the subsequent matter in which disqualification is sought. The rule thus does
not necessarily involve any inquiry into the imponderables involved in the degree of
relationship between the two matters but instead involves a realistic appraisal of the
possibility that confidences had been disclosed in the one matter which will be harmful to
the client in the other.

Id. at 224. But see Griffith v. Taylor, 937 P.2d 297, 301 (Alaska 1997) (finding that the substantial
relationship test should apply even if no confidential information is acquired during the course of
representation). Accord E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 397 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
The rule against representing conflicting interests disqualifies an attorney from appearing
adversely to his former client in litigation growing out of the subject matter of the prior
representation. The Court has held that the former client’s failure to disclose confidential
information to his attorney does not disable him from moving to disqualify.

Id.
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.9 (C)(1) cf. MODEL CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at EC 4-5 (barring a lawyer from “us[ing] information
acquired during the representation of a client to the disadvantage of that client”).
92. McMinn, supra note 87, at 1250. See generally e.g., Forbes v. NAMS International Inc., No.
3:07-CV-0039, Slip 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45161 (N.D.N.Y 2007). The defendant, NAMS
International, developed patented software for multimedia entertainment. Forbes and other plaintiffs
invested in NAMS allegedly based on material misrepresentations concerning its capabilities and
ability to obtain patent rights in new technologies in the field. Id. at 5. Attorney Ronald J. Benjamin
represented the plaintiffs. He also represented the defendant, NAMS, in its earlier lawsuit against
Spectra.Net Communications after a proposed merger of the two companies failed. During the
merger negotiations, NAMS shared information concerning its current and future technology. The
district court found that even though eight years had passed, there was a substantial relationship
between the issues raised in both cases and a high probability that Benjamin had access to
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ABA amended Model Rule 1.10 that provides for imputed disqualification to
further promote lawyer mobility and client choice of counsel. 93 When a
lawyer departs one firm for another, Model Rule 1.10 now permits the
departing lawyer’s new firm to avoid having the migratory lawyer’s conflicts
imputed to it by erecting a screen around the new lawyer.94 The screen should
be in place when the migratory lawyer joins the new firm to protect against the
lawyer’s involvement in the conflicted matter. 95
In deciding whether Model Rule 1.7 or 1.9 is applicable for analyzing a
conflict of interest problem, the lawyer must ascertain whether the client is
proceeding against another current or former client of the lawyer. Timing is
important. At what point does a current client become a former client for
purposes of a conflict of interest analysis?
Comment 4 to Model Rule 1.3 provides that, unless representation is
terminated under Model Rule 1.16, a lawyer should “carry through to
conclusion” all the matters undertaken for the client. 96 If the lawyer’s
representation has been limited to a specific matter, the attorney-client
relationship ends when the attorney completes that specific matter. 97

confidential information about NAMS that would be harmful to it in the instant case. Id. at 13-15.
The court granted NAMS’ disqualification motion against Benjamin and stated that the need to
preserve the integrity of and public confidence in the judicial process overrides the plaintiffs’ choice
of legal representation in this case. Id. at 15; see genearlly Disqualification Motion, 23 ENT. L. &
FIN. 4 (Sept. 2007) (discussing the holding in Forbes, No. 3:07-CV-0039, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
45161).
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.10. See 25, NO. 16 ABA/BNA
LAW. MAN. PROF CONDUCT 420 (Aug. 5, 2009) (commenting that the “[r]ules for the first time
provide that private law firms may screen incoming lawyers to avoid the imputation of the lawyer’s
former-client conflicts to the rest of the firm, even without getting consent from the affected former
clients” and noting that if “certain procedural requirements are met, a screened lawyer’s colleagues
may represent clients in matters that the lawyer would be prohibited from handling under the rule on
former client conflicts”).
94. See 25, NO 16. ABA/BNA LAW. MAN. PROF CONDUCT 418 (Aug. 5, 2009) (recognizing that
the ABA approved a modest “‘housekeeping amendment’ to Model Rule 1.10” that clarifies that the
new non-consensual screening procedures in the rule may be used to prevent a firm’s imputed
disqualification only when a lawyer has moved from one firm to another” (citing 25 ABA/BNA LAW
MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 420)).
95. Cf. Kala v. Aluminum Smelting Co., 688 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ohio 1998) (specifically noting
that “all cases” require the screen to “be in place when the attorney joins the firm”—it is “too late” to
screen after the filing of a disqualification motion) with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra
note 14, at R. 1.10 (a)(2)(i)-(iii) cmt. 10 (outlining screen requirements, including that there be a
“timely implementation of a screen”).
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.3 cmt. 4. See also CODE OF
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at DR 7-101(A)(2) (reminding lawyers that they shall not
intentionally fail to carry out a contract of employment with clients for professional services unless
the lawyers withdraw under DR 2-110).
97. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.3 cmt. 4.
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However, if the lawyer has worked for the client for a long time on assorted
matters, the client may assume that the lawyer continues to serve his interests
until the lawyer expressly notifies him of withdrawal. 98 As Comment 4
suggests, “doubt[s] about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists
should be clarified . . . in writing.” 99 Just as with engagement letters, good
practice dictates that lawyers send clients a conclusion of services letter. 100
In IBM Corp. v. Levin, 101 the Third Circuit discussed when a current client
becomes a former client. In IBM, the court found that the law firm had an ongoing attorney-client relationship with both IBM and the party the firm was
representing against IBM. 102 Although the firm did not have a specific
retainer agreement with IBM when it filed its compliant against IBM, the court
found that “the pattern of repeat retainers, both before and after the filing of
the complaint, support[ed] the finding of a continuous relationship.” 103
VI. IMPLEMENTING INTERNAL CONTROLS IN THE OFFICE
A law firm is often faced with a malpractice claim that it could have
avoided by implementing internal controls in its office. Internal controls help
ensure that common errors do not occur. 104
For example, although
calendaring errors are a leading cause of malpractice, a firm should be able to
avoid these errors by establishing an office-wide calendar with a well-defined
procedure for its use. 105 A calendaring system needs to be user-friendly; it
should be easy to learn, use, and maintain. 106 The calendaring system should
also have an off-site backup in case of problems in the central system. 107 The
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
54.
101. See generally IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978).
102. Id. at 281.
103. Id. See John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
825, 840 (1992) (discussing the difficult situation where the lawyer continuously represented a client,
but was not presently involved in a specific matter for the client and stating that “continuing
clientship is usually not a relationship ascertainable from the intentions and behavior of the parties,
but rather a concept imposed with little evidentiary support by a court . . . in order to resolve one or
another question”).
104. See SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.1-,2.4 at 44-58. Certain organizational controls
and individual practice procedures can improve the overall competence of attorneys and the quality
of the services they render. Id. at 50-51.
105. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
72.
106. Id. at 52.
107. Id.
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system should be able to find discrepancies between the central and back-up
calendar, and should have a tracking system to know who made changes and
what changes were made. 108 Further, the calendaring system should give each
open matter a review date so the firm can regularly review each file. 109
Law firms should consider an additional internal control by establishing
committees to help prevent malpractice and to enhance the quality of work
performed for clients. 110 Just as firms benefit from a managing partner or a
managing committee, firms also benefit from such “quality control
committees.” 111 The firm should determine the committee’s responsibilities,
who will serve on it, and the extent to which the committee’s determinations
are final. 112 Possible functions that the committee could perform include:
considering possible ethical problems; developing a procedure for opening a
new file; identifying criteria for evaluating clients and claims; establishing a
billing procedure; maintaining form files; preventing document loss;
developing a policy for referrals, scheduling projects, and events; and creating
stress and alcohol awareness programs. 113
An important internal control is one aimed at avoiding conflicts of interest.
Relying solely on lawyers’ memories to uncover conflicts is no longer
sufficient. 114 Instead, firms should have a “systemized procedure for
documenting and analyzing potential conflicts for every new client and new
matter accepted by the firm.” 115 Conflict-check systems must provide a
method for matching names. 116 If a firm has multiple offices, the names of
the clients and matters of one office should be accessible by any other office in
the firm. 117 Additionally, when the firm accepts a new case, it should

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.2, at 51-52.
111. Id. at 51-52. Smith and Mallen suggest several names for committees aimed at preventing
malpractice, including: “(1) quality control; (2) quality assurance; (3) risk management; and (4)
professional responsibility.” Id. § 2.3, at 52. “Quality Control Committees” or “Quality Assurance
Committees” are the preferred names because the focus is on increasing quality, as opposed to
decreasing risk, and generally carry a more positive connotation. Id.
112. Id. § 2.3, at 52-53.
113. Id. § 2.4, at 55-58 (providing a more extensive list of possible committee functions).
114. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
57.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. Id. Page 85 features a chart entitled “Types of Names to Track in Conflict System.” This
chart gives the list of important people to track depending on the type of representation. For example,
for a probate case, the chart suggests tracking the decedent, personal representative, the
“spouse/children/heirs/devisees” and the “trustee/guardian/conservator.” Id.
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circulate a “new matter memo” to lawyers and support staff within the firm. 118
This memo should identify the parties and the intake attorney. 119 The memo
also should state what the case is about and what services the firm will
provide. 120 By circulating the memo, other lawyers are warned about
accepting prospective clients and matters that have conflicts with the new
client. 121
It also is essential that firms establish a system to ensure adequate
documentation of work. 122 For example, preferably more than one person
should check the content and accuracy of all documents—such as letters,
briefs, contracts, and motions—before the documents leave the firm. 123 Each
client and matter should have its own file for all documents the lawyer
prepares or receives. 124 Relevant documents should be filed daily. 125 This
ensures that documents are not misplaced and that others will know that they
are looking at an up-to-date file. 126
VII. IDENTIFYING ATTORNEY COMPETENCY ISSUES
Lawyers should provide their clients with competent representation;
failure to do so can lead to a malpractice action, 127 Rule 11 sanctions, 128 and

118. Id. at 58. See SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.4, at 56 (evaluating a client or
transaction should “require[] consultation between the originating attorney and another partner or
committee”).
119. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
58.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 59.
123. Id. See SMITH & MALLEN, supra note 4, § 2.4, at 51-52, 55-58. A law firm’s quality
assurance committee should oversee “[w]ork control” issues. Id. at 56-57.
124. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
59.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See generally Battle v. Thornton, 646 A.2d 315 (D.C. 1994) (stating that in a jurisdiction
that does not certify specialists, the standard of care at issue in a malpractice action is that of an
ordinary lawyer). Lawyers who communicate that their practice is “limited to” or that they “primarily
handle” or “specialize in” entertainment law may be held to a higher standard of care than other
lawyers. See Wright v. Williams, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (Ct. App. 1975) (noting that “a lawyer
holding himself out to the public and the profession as specializing in an area of the law must exercise
the skill, prudence, and diligence exercised by other specialists of ordinary skill and capacity
specializing in the same field”).
128. See e.g., Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Heslep, 2007 WL 1435395, *8 (N.D. Tex. 2007)
(holding that Rule 11 sanctions against Heslep’s attorney were appropriate for filing a frivolous
motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs’ attorney). In addition to Rule 11 sanctions, the court may
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discipline. 129 Model Rule 1.1 helps define competency and states the basic
principle that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. 130
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” 131
exercise broad inherent authority to discipline attorneys. See generally Muzikowski v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 477 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2007). In Muzikowski, the plaintiff sued Paramount Pictures
claiming that its film, Hardball, about a little league coach, “was a thinly disguised biography of him”
and that it was defamatory and placed Muzikowski in a false light. Id. at 903. The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant. It also upheld the court’s
award of reasonable attorney fees as a sanction against the plaintiff’s lawyers under Rule 37(b)(2) for
willfully disobeying a court order to identify the documents that the plaintiff intended to use at trial.
Id. at 909 (holding that “[d]istrict courts possess wide latitude in fashioning appropriate sanctions and
evaluating the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees requested” (citing Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d
656, 661 (7th Cir. 1999)). “Rather than comply with the [trial court’s] order, [the plaintiff’s] lawyers
identified 14,599 pages of documents that they characterized as ‘for possible use at trial.’” Id. at 909.
When questioned about their failure to comply with the court’s order, the lawyers “mysterious[ly]”
claimed the court had never issued such an order. Id.
129. See generally e.g., Att’y. Grievance Comm’n v. Midlen, 911 A.2d 852 (2006). Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries (JSM) hired attorney John Midlen Jr. to represent JSM for royalty distributions
by the Librarian of Congress for cable TV broadcasts of JSM religious programs. Id. at 855.
Initially, Midlen and JSM agreed that Midlen would deduct his fees from the distribution checks and
remit the remaining balance to JSM. Id. JSM instructed Midlen that it no longer wanted Milden to
deduct his fees before submitting the royalties to JSM. Id. at 856. Milden continued to deduct his
fees and was fired. JSM claimed that Milden took months to return its client files and failed to
provide “understandable legal bills” and an accounting of funds collected on JSM’s behalf. Id. at
857-58. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals suspended him from practice for eighteen
months. Id. at 853. Imposing reciprocal discipline, the Court of Appeals of Maryland suspended
Milden for eighteen months but found insufficient evidence to have the suspensions run concurrently.
Id. at 867; see also Rosenthal v. State Bar, 738 P.2d 723, 725 (Cal. 1987) (disbarring attorney
Rosenthal for his representation of actress Doris Day Melcher, her late husband, and her son because
of egregious misconduct, such as conducting transactions with undisclosed conflicts of interest, taking
positions adverse to former clients, overstating expenses and double-billing for legal fees, filing
fraudulent claims, and giving false testimony).
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.1. The Code counterpart to
Rule 1.1 is DR 6-101. DR 6-101(A) (1) provides that a lawyer must not “[h]andle a legal matter
which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a
lawyer who is competent to handle it.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at
DR 6-101(A) (1). In addition, DR 6-101(A)(2) and (3) prohibit a lawyer from handling a legal matter
without adequate preparation and from neglecting “a legal matter entrusted to him.” Id. at DR 6101(A)(2), (3).
131. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.1. See Love v. Mail on Sunday,
473 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2007), for an entertainment law case that was critical of a
lawyer’s skill, preparation and candor. The plaintiff, Mike Love, and the defendant, Brian Wilson,
were members of the musical group, The Beach Boys. Id. at 1053. Love alleged that the defendants
recorded and distributed a CD of Beach Boys songs to millions of people without Love’s
authorization. Id. The CD was distributed in the United Kingdom through the Sept. 4, 2004, edition
of the newspaper, Mail on Sunday. Id. at 1053-54. Love sued for unfair competition under the
Lanham Act “based on the CD’s use of the Beach Boys photos that included plaintiff’s image, and on
the use of the phrase ‘The Beach Boys’ on the CD and related advertisements for the CD.” Id. at
1054. The district court held that the Lanham Act did not apply because the allegedly infringing
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Determination of whether a lawyer is competent to undertake representation
depends on the complexity of the matter, the lawyer’s experience both in
general and with the particular matter, the preparation the lawyer is able to
undertake, and the possibility of receiving assistance from another lawyer on
staff who is already competent in the matter. 132
Competent handling of a matter starts with the initial client and case
screening. The entertainment lawyer needs to realistically evaluate his or her
knowledge and skill concerning the subject matter of the proposed
representation. The lawyer needs to determine whether he or she has
sufficient experience to properly handle the matter.
Another important question that the lawyer must consider is whether he or
she has sufficient time to undertake representation. Major litigation and
complex issues generally demand more of a lawyer’s time than simpler
issues. 133 If an otherwise competent lawyer knows he or she cannot devote
proper attention to a matter, the lawyer should not accept it. 134 Model Rule
1.1 allows a lawyer to undertake representation if he or she can become
competent through proper study. 135 However, a lawyer should be wary of
hastily undertaking representation in a matter that appears simple but falls
outside his or her area of expertise or experience. 136 The lawyer may not
acts—the United Kingdom CD sales—occurred overseas and granted summary judgment for the
defendants. Id. at 1058. The court sanctioned Love’s attorney $1,000 for misleading and deceiving
the court and wasting time and resources. Id. at 1059-60. The court strongly admonished Love for
his disingenuous claim of California residency and “submitting a sloppily-assembled opposition
brief.” Id. at 1059. Love’s counsel also submitted a consumer’s Declaration that he had purchased a
CD in the United States on eBay in hope of demonstrating that the CDs had reached the United States
market. Id. The purchaser was not an innocent and independent consumer but rather someone who
had been represented by or a co-plaintiff with Love’s counsel. Id. The court stated that at a
minimum, Love’s counsel should have disclosed his relationship with the consumer. Id. The rift
between Love and Wilson resulted in another reported decision. See Love v. Mail on Sunday, 489 F.
Supp. 2d 1100, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (granting summary judgment for the defendant, Brian Wilson,
a member of the musical group the Beach Boys, and finding that he did not breach a fiduciary duty to
another group member, Mike Love, based on an alleged partnership).
132. See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26,
at 54-56; see also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 3 (recommending that lawyers attend continuing
legal education programs discussing developments in the entertainment field).
133. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.1 cmt. 5.
134. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
55.
135. The Code counterpart to Rule 1.1 is EC 6-3 (permitting a lawyer to undertake representation
“if in good faith he expects to become qualified through study and investigation” and providing it
does not result in undue delay or cost to the client). MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY,
supra note 14, at EC 6-3.
136. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
55. See also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 187 (1986). “Competence requires a
fair modicum of knowledge and skill. A lawyer must know at least the basic elements of the law
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initially appreciate the amount of work necessary to provide competent
representation and may quickly find the case to be unduly burdensome. 137
Lawyers should avoid the client who brings the lawyer a case in the
“eleventh hour.” 138 A lawyer who handles a case right before the statute of
limitations expires risks having insufficient time to investigate the matter,
increases the chance of overlooking claims or parties, and is more likely to
miss the statute of limitations. 139 All of these errors constitute grounds for an
attorney-malpractice claim. The attorney may ultimately pay for the client’s
procrastination. 140
Lawyers should not automatically agree to represent a client because they
are a family member or a friend. 141 These persons are just as apt as other
clients to have unrealistic expectations about the lawyer’s obligations, efforts,
fees, and results. 142 Although it may seem counterintuitive, effective
communication with a friend or family member may be more difficult because
of the personal history of the parties. Disgruntled clients who are friends or
family members may even experience a special sense of disappointment or
betrayal, which enhances the likelihood of the client filing a grievance or
malpractice action against the lawyer. 143
Competency involves adequate research and investigation. Almost half of
all malpractice claims stem from substantive errors. 144 For example, the
lawyer may not know or correctly apply the law, or the lawyer may conduct
insufficient discovery or investigation. 145 The lawyer may not know the
involved in representing a client.” Id.
137. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
55. “Yes, you can develop the expertise given sufficient time, but keep in mind that sufficient time
will be far more than meets the eye at first glance and the client will not be willing to pay for your
education.” Id. The ABA opposes “dabbling” in complex areas of the law, and contends that “there
is no such thing as a simple will or a cut-and-dried personal injury case.” Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see WOLFRAM, supra note 136, 186-87.
140. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
55; see WOLFRAM, supra note 136, at 191-92.
141. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
55.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 56 (noting that in 1999 the ABA reported that forty-six percent of all malpractice
claims resulted from substantive errors).
145. Id. See Dimensional Music Publishing, LLC v. Kersey, 448 F. Supp. 2d 643 (E.D. Pa.
2006), for an entertainment law case involving allegations of improper investigation and due
diligence. The plaintiff, Dimensional, a limited liability company engaged in music publishing, filed
suit for a declaratory judgment to determine if it owned exclusively all the rights in the composition,
“Disco Inferno,” written by Tyrone Kersey and Leroy Green. Id. at 646-47. If Dimensional cannot
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applicable deadlines or may make planning and procedural choice errors. 146
Lawyers may avoid these substantive errors by carefully and thoroughly
researching the law, by reviewing the work of subordinate lawyers and staff,
and by consulting experts in the field. 147 Lawyers must keep abreast of legal
developments in their field in hope of minimizing the risk of substantive
error. 148 A firm-wide written policy encouraging and funding Continuing
Legal Education (CLE) offers lawyers the opportunity to learn of recent
developments and to fine tune existing knowledge and skills. Lawyers should
also consider reviewing closed files and contacting clients when recent
developments may affect their interests. For example, an estate planning
lawyer may wish to contact a former client about tax code changes that affect
the client’s will or trust.
A. Competency Issues and Technology
Lawyer competence today is increasingly dependent upon the
understanding and use of technology. 149 Technology facilitates greater and
be the owner, Dimensional alleges the result was a product of malpractice by Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison (Paul Weiss) in failing “to discover and report to plaintiff the risk that there was
never a valid transfer of Kersey’s renewal rights in the [c]ompositon.” Id. at 654. Paul Weiss argued
that it never represented the plaintiff, but the court found “there was at least a relationship of privity.”
Id. at 655.
146. Id.; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 136, at 185-88.
147. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
56; see also Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that consultations with “more experienced
entertainment lawyers are common and highly advisable”).
148. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER’S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at
56; see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.1 cmt. 6 (stating that a “lawyer
should keep abreast of changes”) cf. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 14, at EC
6-2 (noting that a lawyer maintains “his competence by keeping abreast of current legal literature and
developments, [and] participating in continuing legal education programs”). The competent practice
of law also requires lawyers to remain aware of business developments in the industries in which they
practice that might affect their ability to provide competent representation. For example, lawyers in
the music industry need to know about new business models, trends, and deal points concerning the
digital distribution of music. See generally Robert Levine, Buying Music From Anywhere and Selling
It for Play on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2006, at C1 (noting how “the economics of online
stores is changing the financial calculations of the music business and making it profitable to sell a
relatively small number of copies of a song,” and reporting about various digital music distribution
deals).
149. See DAVID I.C. THOMSON, LAW SCHOOL 2.0: LEGAL EDUCATION FOR A DIGITAL AGE
(2009). Understanding technology includes appreciating its impact on business models and deal
points. For example, in the publishing industry there is a question about who owns the digital rights
to “backlisted books”—older publications—and how much the rights are worth. See Motoko Rich,
Plot Twist for Familiar Works: Who Owns the E-Book Rights?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009, at A1.
Authors contend that it costs publishers much less to publish and release digital versions of works.
Id. Accordingly, authors want more than the traditional digital royalty rate of twenty-five percent of
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faster communication between lawyers and clients as well as with third
parties, such as witnesses and court personnel. 150 Technology also facilitates
efficient and comprehensive research, the negotiating and drafting of
documents, the presentation of a client’s case in a courtroom or other
These
proceeding, and the storage and retrieval of information. 151
technological benefits play an important role in helping lawyers to meet their
ethical obligation to provide competent representation. 152
The inability to understand and to properly use technology may interfere
with a lawyer’s ability to provide competent representation. For example, a
litigator “who produces electronic documents but [who] does not understand
metadata is potentially committing malpractice.” 153
Another common technology problem concerns the rapid pace and
pervasiveness of electronic communication and its concomitant demands upon
lawyers for immediate advice. 154 It is easy for a lawyer to make a
misstatement or offer questionable advice under the pressure of high paced
communications. In general, lawyers should resist knee-jerk replies to emails
and instead carve out adequate time for reflection and the editing of replies.

net proceeds, which is generally less than they “typically receive on hardcover editions.” Id. See
generally Andrew Adam Newman, A New Novel, Edited Down And Read in a Free Podcast, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009, at B4 (reporting on an industry first where a publisher, Hachette Audio,
released for free on iTunes an abridged and serialized audio version of “Transition” by Ian. M. Banks
in hope of increasing full downloads ($19.95) and hardcover sales ($25.99)); Brain Stelter, Web-TV
Divide Is Back in Focus With NBC Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009, at A1 (highlighting that online
consumption of videos and television streams is soaring and that the television industry’s business
model is changing to restrict streaming; quoting Stephen B. Burke, the chief operating officer of
Comcast, ‘“[streaming is] the biggest social movement I’ve ever seen’”).
150. The ease and speed of electronic communications may heighten concerns about ethical
violations. See generally Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. No. 2009-20 (Nov. 17, 2009);
see also In the Nation, Facebook Limit for Judges, AKRON BEACON J., Dec. 12, 2009, at A2
(reporting that the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee opined that lawyers and judges should
no longer “friend” each other because it might suggest “that lawyers are in a position to influence
their judge friends”).
151. See THOMSON, supra note 149, at 46. A 2006 ABA Survey found “that the percentage of
firms that had never e-filed a court document dropped precipitously from 70 percent to 40 percent”
and that one study showed two-thirds of survey respondents started their research with online sources.
Id. at 48 (citing Sanford N. Greenberg, Legal Research Training: Preparing Student for a Rapidly
Changing Environment, 13 J. LEGAL WRITING 241, 247 (2007)).
152. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 14, at R. 1.1. These technological benefits
also promote lawyer compliance with ethical precepts reflected in other rules. See, e.g., id. at R. 1.3
(addressing the lawyer’s duty of diligence); Id. at R.1.4 (requiring lawyers to communicate with
clients).
153. THOMSON, supra note 149, at 52.
154. See generally id. at vii –viii (reporting that “[t]he Internet has achieved massive growth” and
that “[a] generation of students has grown up with the sophisticated and pervasive use of technology
in nearly every facet of their lives”).
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Technology has also presented new hurdles to lawyer competency in the
discovery process. The “expanding use of electronic communication and the
relatively low cost of storing electronic information” has prompted one expert
to write, “ “[t]he discovery process today is . . . drowning in potential sources
of information.” 155
Lawyers play a key role in the discovery process by identifying,
collecting, and reviewing information. Lawyers, clients, and judges all have
an interest in maximizing the quality of discovery, which often means “using
automated tools to produce a reliable, reproducible and consistent product.” 156
Thus lawyers are well advised to consult with experts in the storage and
retrieval of electronic communication in light of the potential for
malpractice. 157 In Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., lawyers were held
responsible for failing to disclose e-mails and other documents that were
detrimental to their case. 158
Lawyers may obtain discovery regarding any matter that is not privileged
and is relevant to a party’s claim or defense subject to some limitations. 159
Entertainment lawyers should inform clients as soon as possible about the
potential large costs associated with the retrieval of information. 160 “[A]
155. The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search and Information
Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 191, 197 (2007) [hereinafter Sedona
Conference].
156. Id. at 199.
157. United States v. Ganier, 468 F.3d 920, 923, 926 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the
categorization of computer-related evidence is a relatively new question,” in a case where the
defendant was charged, in part, with obstruction of justice for deleting emails pursuant to an “email
‘retention’ policy”). The court held that the FBI agent’s testimony about forensic computer tests
constituted expert testimony and not lay opinion. Id. at 926-27.
158. See generally Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom, Corp., 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7,
2008), vacated in part by Qualcomm, Inc. v. Broadcom, Corp., 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5,
2008). See Paul Gupta, Dianna Szego & Jennifer Jacobs, Determining When the Duty to Preserve
Arises and Managing Compliance with the Legal and Ethical E-Discovery Obligations, in PLI
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY GUIDANCE 2008: WHAT CORPORATE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL NEED TO
KNOW 217 (2008).
159. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ordering a defendant
in a gender discrimination suit to produce all relevant e-mails including those deleted that were on
back up disks; providing an excellent discussion of the “proportionality test” under FRCP
26(b)(2)(i)(ii) and (iii) for shifting the costs of production to the requesting party).
160. There are several reported cases involving both the retrieval of electronic information and
the entertainment industry. See generally e.g., Rowe Entm’t Inc. v. The William Morris Agency, Inc.,
205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). In Rowe Entm’t Inc., the plaintiffs were African American concert
promoters who claimed that certain booking agencies and promoters had engaged in discriminatory
and anti-competitive practices. The plaintiffs made broad requests for e-mail correspondence. The
defendants claimed that producing these e-mails was enormously expensive and they sought a
protective order relieving them of the burden of production. The court ruled that the defendants had
to produce the e-mails even if it involved a huge expense because it was likely that they would reveal
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midsize case can generate up to 500 gigabytes of potentially relevant data
[which] could cost as much as $3.5 million to process and review . . . before
production.” 161 Both the substantial cost and time involved in producing all
relevant information in discovery has caused firms to outsource the production
of information or to depend on their clients to produce the information.
Although lawyers may outsource their work for e-discovery or have their
clients search all relevant documents, lawyers are ultimately responsible for
the production of all relevant information. 162
VIII. CONCLUSION
Lawyers need to continually reassess how they practice law to ensure that
their work conforms to good practice standards. 163 This is especially true for
entertainment lawyers who work in a highly competitive and rapidly changing
relevant information. However, the court shifted the cost of production to the plaintiffs. See
generally Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46364 (C. D. Ca. 2007);
Columbia Pictures Industries v. Fung, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97576 (Cent. D. Ca. June 8, 2007).
Columbia pictures sued the owners of various websites for encouraging users to download
copyrighted materials for free on their websites. See generally Fung, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97576.
Columbia Pictures requested that the defendants in both cases preserve and produce electronic data,
including the IP addresses of the website users. Id. The court held in both Columbia Pictures
Industries v. Bunnell and Columbia Pictures Industries v. Fung that the preservation and production
of this data was relevant and proper. See generally id; Bunnell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46364.
161. THOMSON, supra note 149, at 52. “[T]he costs of storage have plummeted from $20,000
per gigabyte in 1990 to less than $1 per gigabyte today.” Sedona Conference, supra note 152, at 198
(citing Michelle Kessler, Days of Officially Drowning in Data Almost Upon Us, USA TODAY, Mar. 5,
2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-03-05-data_N.htm).
162. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. No.08-451
(2008) (permitting “a lawyer to outsource legal and non-legal support services provided the lawyer
remains ultimately responsible for providing competent legal services to the client under Model Rule
1.1”). A lawyer who outsources work must comply with Rules 5.1 and 5.3. Id. Thus, the
outsourcing lawyer must undertake reasonable efforts to ensure that lawyers or non-lawyers who
receive outsourced work act in accordance with the outsourcing lawyer’s professional obligations. Id.
A lawyer should inform his or her client about the outsourcing of work and obtain client consent
when the lawyers or non-lawyers performing outsourced work receive information protected by Rule
1.6. Id. See generally Eileen Libby, A Qualified Yes, 94 ABA J. 32 (Nov. 2008).
163. Abdo & Sahl, supra note 1, at 3 (recommending that entertainment lawyers conduct
professional responsibility audits of their practices to ensure that they are complying with state ethical
codes and noting that records of such audits may be “useful evidence of the lawyer’s efforts to
comply with ethical standards if the lawyer becomes the subject of a grievance or a malpractice
action”). The ABA is also engaged in a major reassessment of existing rules of lawyer conduct
because of the increasing globalization of the practice of law and “rapid advances in technology.”
Joan C. Rogers, Agenda for Ethics 20/20 Project Examines Impact of Technology, Disappearing
Borders, in NO. 25 ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 694 (2009); See also
Pamela Atkins, ABA Launches New Initiative to Revamp Lawyer Ethics Rules, in NO. 16 ABA/BNA
LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 418 (2009) (reporting about the creation of the
ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, and its task of taking a “fresh look at legal ethics and the
regulation of the profession”).
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business environment. 164 Lawyers must be flexible in adapting to this everchanging business landscape, but they must also be resolute in their
commitment to good practice standards. 165 The standards discussed in this
article will hopefully protect entertainment and other lawyers from being the
target of disciplinary and legal malpractice actions.

164. Tim Arango, G E. Makes It Official: NBC Will Go To Comcast, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009 at
B3 (recognizing that G.E.’s acquisition of NBC “reshapes the entertainment industry, giving a cable
provider a huge portfolio of new content, even as it raises the sector’s anxieties about the future”);
Jeffrey R. Young, Music Industry Changes Tune of New Program to Fight File Sharing, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 13, 2009, at A12 (reporting about Choruss, a new experimental service led by
Warner Music Group, that would allow students at six undisclosed colleges to pay a blanket license
fee, “similar to what radio stations pay to air popular songs,” to download music “to their own
computers with no restrictions”); Brooks Barnes, After Mickey’s Makeover, Look for a Little Less Mr.
Nice Guy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009 at A4 (discussing how Disney is “re-imaging” Mickey Mouse to
induce “new generations of texting, tech-savy children to embrace him”); Brooks Barnes & Michael
Cieply, Disney Swoops Into Action, Buying Marvel For $4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2009, at B7
(describing Disney’s acquisition, and it possibly “herald[ing] a new wave of media consolidation”);
Jenna Wortham, iPhone Games Give Music Artists New Spotlight, AKRON BEACON J., Dec. 26, 2008,
at C8 (describing how a simple game for iPhone has become “an Internet-age mobile stage for
musicians;” reporting that in October 2008, players of Tap Tap Revenge—an iPhone game—bought
50,000 copies of the featured track Hot n Cold by Katy Perry). “The gravy train of the old days of
having CD sales buffer you as an artist are gone,” as artists “tr[y] to be in more than one place at
once.” Id. at C9. See generally, Jack P. Sahl, The New Era—Qua Vadis 43 AKRON L. REV. 1
(2010) (discussing the fall 2009 Miller-Becker Institute for Professional Responsibility Inaugural
Symposium titled “Lawyers Beyond Borders” and “Practicing Law in the Electronic Age” that
examined the challenges confronting lawyers in an increasingly global and techonological era).
165. See Rogers, supra note 163, at 696 (stating that “the ultimate goal is ‘to help the legal
profession respond to the opportunities and challenges’ that advances in technology have created
while preserving the core values of the profession” (quoting, in part, Ethics 20/20 Commission Cochair Michael Traynor)).

